Topic: Facts about Boko Haram  (Read 2017 times)

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Facts about Boko Haram
« on: January 09, 2012, 07:03:40 AM »
The organisational structure of any group determines its strengths and weaknesses. However, the main determinants in such structures are their complexities — the more complex, the stronger, and the more difficult to dismantle and vice versa.

It may have been observed that many incorporations or organisations have not recorded higher economic success than their (more successful) business counterparts due to the fact that they have not been able to understand the same market structures for their complexities. In view of this, it should be clearly understood that terrorism, like those organisational structures, is an activity planned and intended to achieve particular goals — it is a rationally employed, specifically selected tactic, and it is never a random act.

Terrorist groups can be at various stages of development in terms of capabilities and sophistication. Therefore, the seeming inability of the Nigerian security agencies to arrest the prevailing terrorist activities in the country is due to the fact that the terror group has such an organisational structure that is acquiring strength through complexities.

A terrorist group may form one cell or many cells that operate locally or internationally. The disintegration of terrorist organisation into smaller units called cells makes the organisational structure more complex, difficult and effective in their operations. The cells are the smallest elements of the terrorist group, yet the most effective driving force of the operation of the organisation — cells serve as building blocks for the entire organisation.

One of the primary reasons for this cellular or compartmentalised structure is security. This is the reason the Nigerian Islamist Boko Haram sect seems quite elusive, operation-wise and has been able to carry out successful attacks against the Nigerian populace in recent times.

The compromise or loss of one cell should not compromise the identity, location or actions of other cells, because a cellular organisational structure (like the Boko Haram sect) makes it very difficult for an adversary to penetrate the organisation. Cells are used to control members of the group — members remain in close contact with one another to provide support and, most especially, to prevent desertion or breach of security procedures.

The personnel within one cell are often unaware of the existence of other cells, and this makes it quite difficult for them to divulge sensitive information to infiltrators. Hence, why it seems so impossible for the Nigerian security agencies to extract useful and intelligence information that could curb the proliferation of Boko Haram’s dastardly operations (especially any time an arrest of a member of the sect is said to have been made) is not far-fetched.

However, it is also good to note that it makes no rational sense to want to understand ‘complexity’ without first considering the cultural factor of the particular milieu where the action is taking place.

One major factor that makes the phenomenon of terrorist attacks in Nigeria seem successful is because the ‘ideology’ that is driving the movement is not without an element of culture and religiosity, through which it is subtly sold and accepted in oblivion. In other words, the Boko Haram Islamist sect is a religion-oriented and millenarian group which would inflict as many casualties as possible, and because of the apocalyptic frame of reference they use, loss of life is irrelevant, and more casualties are better. Losses among their co-religionists are of little account because such casualties will reap ‘the benefits of afterlife.’ That is, in fact, the essence of their religiosity.

Likewise non-believers, whether they are the intended targets or collateral damage, deserve death, and killing them may be considered a moral duty. For example, in his martyrdom video, Mohammed Sidique Khan, one of the 7/7 bombers said, ‘I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what this world has to offer. Our religion is Islam, obedience to the one true God and following the footsteps of the final prophet messenger.’ (Al Jazeera, September 1, 2005). Hence, the kind of targets adopted reflects the motivations and ideologies.

Therefore, in a multi-cultural society like Nigeria, for instance, inviting foreign experts to help fight terrorism is really not out of place, because if ‘organised crime’ is indeed a global phenomenon, by definition it must be beyond the capacity and capability of any one national government to control, but only that those experts would need to, first, carefully understand the Nigerian (crime) culture before they could carry out effective counter-terrorism operations. Every organised crime is a common menace, albeit without a common ‘criminal code,’ ‘which is always socially and/or culturally defined).

Considering the present economic hardship and the deteriorating living standard of the average Nigerian, especially in the northern regions where the phenomenon of the terrorist groups’ activities is prevalent, one may be deceived to submit to a logical conclusion by arguing that the terrorist group cannot afford improvised explosive devices or bombs without some source of sponsorship, either from certain iconoclastic elements within the Nigerian society or by their overseas counterparts.

As logical as this may sound, one must not be unaware that IEDs are inexpensive and, of course, easy to make. And because they are modern devices, they are also smaller and are harder to detect. Hence, this makes the operation of Boko Haram successful in Nigeria, and particularly in the Northern parts.

From the foregoing, one can decipher some of the main intents of Boko Haram. Obviously, they unleash terror in order to produce widespread fear, obtain worldwide, national, or local recognition for their cause by attracting the media, and they harass, weaken and embarrass the Nigerian government security forces so that the government overreacts and appears repressive.

This will discourage foreign investments, tourism and assistance programmes that can affect the target country’s economy and support of the government in power.

Community-oriented efforts and intelligence-led policing are a key weapon that is inevitable if Nigeria must curtail the dastardly operations of the violent Islamist Boko Haram sect

 

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